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FIRST AMENDMENT
Executive Order by the Governor Limiting Large Gatherings
Statewide
U.S. CONSTITUTION:
EXECUTIVE ORDER:
EFFECTIVE DATE:
SUMMARY:

U.S. CONST. amend. I
Ga. Exec. Order No. 03.23.20.01
March 23, 2020
Beginning in March 2020, Georgia
Governor Brian Kemp (R) issued a
series of Executive Orders addressing
the State’s response to the COVID-19
pandemic. Included in these Orders
was a prohibition on large groups of
people gathering in a single location.
Though an effective means of
curtailing
the
virus’s
rapid
transmission, this specific provision
became a source of controversy for
groups who believed such a prohibition
infringed upon their First Amendment
rights.

Introduction
Throughout American history, national emergencies have tested
the resilience of the fundamental liberties found in the Bill of Rights. 1
In times of crisis, elected officials, especially those in the executive
branches of federal and state governments, must delicately balance
public safety with individual liberty. The resulting policy decisions
often result in litigation, shifting the responsibility of this balancing
act to the judiciary. 2 State government responses to the COVID-19
1. See generally, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (addressing the
constitutionality an exclusionary order imposed against all persons of Japanese descent during World
War II), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S.
11 (1905) (addressing the constitutionality of a compulsory vaccination law in Massachusetts).
2. See, e.g., Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 231 (Roberts, J., concurring) (“The liberty of every American
citizen . . . must frequently, in the face of sudden danger, be temporarily limited or suspended.”).
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pandemic presented the latest iteration of this constitutional tension.
Specifically, state directives aimed at protecting public health by
restricting large gatherings raise challenging First Amendment issues
involving freedom of speech, assembly, and religion.3 In Georgia,
Governor Brian Kemp’s (R) COVID-19 Executive Orders—although
less prohibitive than those in other states—implicated these concerns
and faced backlash from some residents.4
Background
The COVID-19 Pandemic
In January 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) began
investigating an outbreak of a novel coronavirus from Wuhan,
China.5 This new disease, now known as COVID-19, spread quickly
throughout the world.6 In response, the WHO declared a Public
Health Emergency of International Concern on January 30. 7 Less
than two months later, on March 11, the WHO upgraded the outbreak
to a pandemic and encouraged all jurisdictions to combat its spread
with “urgent and aggressive action.”8 As of October 10, 2020, more

3. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. Eric Mandel, Gov. Kemp Adds Some Business Restrictions, Does Not Order Full
Shelter-in-Place,
ATLANTA
BUS.
CHRON.
(Mar.
23,
2020,
5:58
PM),
https://www.bizjournals.com/atlanta/news/2020/03/23/gov-kemp-adds-some-business-restrictions-doesnot.html; Vandana Rambaran, Georgia Gov. Kemp Orders Elderly to Shelter in Place, Days After
Loosening
Some
Coronavirus
Restrictions,
FOX
NEWS
(Apr.
30,
2020),
https://www.foxnews.com/us/georgia-elderly-shelter-in-place-coronavirus-restrictions
[https://perma.cc/MB38-A6E2].
5. Novel Coronavirus – China, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (Jan. 12, 2020),
https://www.who.int/csr/don/12-january-2020-novel-coronavirus-china/en/
[https://perma.cc/3YHCRRR6].
6. WHO Director-General’s Opening Remarks at the Media Briefing on COVID-19, WORLD
HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-directorgeneral-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19—-11-march-2020
[https://perma.cc/3EXV-W8YM] [hereinafter WHO Opening Remarks].
7. Statement on the Second Meeting of the International Health Regulations (2005) Emergency
Committee Regarding the Outbreak of Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV), WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION [WHO] (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/30-01-2020-statementon-the-second-meeting-of-the-international-health-regulations-(2005)-emergency-committee-regardingthe-outbreak-of-novel-coronavirus-(2019-ncov) [https://perma.cc/HG7L-UPR8].
8. WHO Opening Remarks, supra note 6.
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than 37 million confirmed cases existed globally, and over a million
people had died from COVID-19.9
Scientists reported the first confirmed case of COVID-19 in the
United States in late January. 10 The Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) had confirmed over seven million cases and
approximately 213,000 deaths from the virus in the United States as
of October 10.11 No state was immune from the spread of the virus;
CDC data showed both confirmed cases and deaths in every state and
most American territories.12 Georgia grappled with high rates of
contagion as well, reporting over 330,000 cases and 7,300 deaths as
of October 10.13
The Government Response to COVID-19
In the wake of the WHO declaration, President Donald Trump (R)
declared a public health emergency in the United States and allocated
additional federal resources to respond to the COVID-19 outbreak.14
The federal government also outlined a series of recommendations
and directives designed to “slow the spread” of the virus.15 These
guidelines advised Americans to stay at home, limit travel, and avoid
congregating in large groups. 16

9. Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Pandemic, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO],
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019 [https://perma.cc/4JTN-PWPX].
10. Michelle L. Holshue et al., First Case of 2019 Novel Coronavirus in the United States, 382 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 929, 929–36 (2020).
11. United States COVID-19 Cases and Deaths by State of CDC COVID Data Tracker, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/casesin-us.html [https://perma.cc/6XPG-8AMD].
12. Cases in the U.S. of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html
[https://perma.cc/EAQ3-3UUG].
13. Georgia Department of Public Health Daily Status Report, GA. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH,
https://dph.georgia.gov/covid-19-daily-status-report [https://perma.cc/8PGE-XN83].
14. Deb Riechmann, US Declares Public Health Emergency from Coronavirus, BOS. GLOBE,
https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2020/01/31/declares-public-health-emergency-fromcoronavirus/9WMXL38AdA08GJworROtII/story.html [https://perma.cc/4FL8-X6K8] (Feb. 1, 2020,
11:40 AM).
15. 15
Days
to
Slow
the
Spread,
WHITE
HOUSE
(Mar.
16,
2020),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/15-days-slow-spread/ [https://perma.cc/G9X7-NHPT].
16. The President’s Coronavirus Guidelines for America, WHITE HOUSE 2 (Mar. 16, 2020),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/03.16.20_coronavirusguidance_8.5x11_315PM.pdf [https://perma.cc/89RS-CXEC].
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Because of the federal system in the United States, however, the
government response to COVID-19 largely depended on the
decisions of each state. 17 By mid-March, every state had followed the
federal government’s lead and declared a state of emergency. 18 These
emergency declarations were accompanied by variations of a
shelter-in-place Order, which generally prohibited gatherings of large
groups.19 In most states, the Executive Orders specifically banned
any public gatherings of more than ten people and mandated the
closure of many businesses.20 The scope and duration of these
Executive Orders varied by jurisdiction. 21 As discussed infra,
Georgia’s Governor first issued an Executive Order imposing
shelter-in-place requirements on April 2, 2020, and gradually lifted
and amended parts of the Order over the subsequent weeks and
months.22
Challenges to Governor Kemp’s Executive Order
Unlike other States’ Executive Orders, the shelter-in-place
provisions of Governor Brian Kemp’s (R) COVID-19-related Orders
did not face highly publicized First Amendment lawsuits, and the
issue now appears moot.23 The mandatory enforcement provisions of
the Order expired on May 1.24
17. See generally Diane Messere Magee, The Constitution and Federalism in the Age of Pandemic,
68 R.I. B. J. 11 (2020).
18. List of States with Emergency Declaration due to COVID-19, HOLLYWOOD L.A. NEWS (Mar. 17,
2020),
https://www.hollywoodlanews.com/states-list-coronavirus-state-of-emergency/
[https://perma.cc/7RUQ-P4TH].
19. Jorge L. Ortiz & Grace Hauk, Coronavirus in the US: How All 50 States Are Responding – and
Why
Eight
Still
Refuse
to
Issue
Stay-at-Home
Orders,
USA
TODAY,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/03/30/coronavirus-stay-home-shelter-in-placeorders-by-state/5092413002/ [https://perma.cc/TY6S-S32K] (Apr. 9, 2020, 2:32 PM).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.02.20.01 (Apr. 2, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State University Law
Review); Ga. Exec. Order No. 06.29.20.01 (June 29, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State University
Law Review).
23. See Barrow v. Raffensperger, 308 Ga. 660, 667, 842 S.E.2d 884, 891 (2020) (“A case is moot
‘when it seeks to determine an issue which, if resolved, cannot have any practical effect on the
underlying controversy, or when such resolution will determine only abstract questions not arising upon
existing facts or rights.’” (quoting Pimper v. State ex rel. Simpson, 274 Ga. 624, 626, 555 S.E.2d 459,
461 (2001))). Moot issues are not justiciable. Id.; see also discussion infra Part Analysis.
24. See Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.08.20.03, at 6 (Apr. 8, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State
University Law Review); see also Coronavirus in Georgia: Shelter-in-Place Comes to an End for Most

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol37/iss1/16

4

Estroff and Gautier: FIRST AMENDMENT: Executive Order by the Governor Limiting Large G

2020]

LEGISLATIVE REVIEW

201

While the Orders were in effect, however, at least one church
disregarded the restrictions on large gatherings by holding in-person
worship services.25 The Statesboro-based Redeeming Love Church of
God the Bibleway’s defiance of the Governor’s Orders resulted in the
Georgia State Patrol issuing citations to church leaders. 26 As of
October 2020, these citations remained pending adjudication.27 The
church’s pastor, Dr. Clayton Cowart, indicated the possibility of First
Amendment litigation to challenge the applicability of the Executive
Orders to religious gatherings and churches. 28
Free Exercise Clause challenges to similar bans on large
gatherings by religious groups in other states led to the development
of a body of federal case law culminating in an opinion by the U.S.
Supreme Court declining to grant an interlocutory emergency
injunction against California’s restriction on large gatherings as
applied to churches. 29 Although that Order arguably established that
these types of restrictions are consistent with the First Amendment,
Georgians, WSB-TV, https://www.wsbtv.com/news/local/coronavirus-georgia-shelter-in-place-comesan-end-most-georgians/R4QGJPB3QFGHTMQUGI7G6OP36M/ [https://perma.cc/8FFF-ZRDL] (May
1, 2020, 9:59 AM). A comprehensive Westlaw and Lexis search of trial court documents by the authors
revealed no cases and no pending litigation asserting First Amendment claims against Governor Kemp
or any other Georgia officials related to the Executive Orders as of October 2020. A similar search of
news aggregators and a web search generally did not reveal any reports of First Amendment challenges
to the Orders. Various businesses and groups, however, filed Second Amendment and Fourteenth
Amendment claims against the State of Georgia, as well as voting rights claims related to the
COVID-19 restrictions. See, e.g., Coal. for Good Governance v. Raffensperger, No.
1:20-cv-01677-TCB, 2020 WL 1932930 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 20, 2020); Ga. Ass’n of Latino Elected
Officials, Inc. v. Gwinnett Cnty. Bd. of Registration and Elections, No. 1:20-cv-01587-WMR, 2020 WL
1870338 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 14, 2020).
25. Greg Bluestein, A Statesboro Church’s Defiance Underscores Kemp’s Shutdown Dilemma,
ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.ajc.com/blog/politics/statesboro-church-defianceunderscores-kemp-dilemma/BZhxqcdDE1wemnOL0xs19L/ [https://perma.cc/K8ZM-SZ7E].
26. La’Tasha Givens, Georgia Pastor, Church Members Cited for Not Following Shelter-in-Place
Order, 11ALIVE, https://www.11alive.com/article/news/health/coronavirus/georgia-pastor-and-churchmembers-cited-for-not-following-stay-in-shelter-order/85-d226c371-d53a-4796-82ee-4fbc1286ec5b
(Apr. 7, 2020, 10:12 PM).
27. Telephone Interview with Dr. Clayton Cowart, Presiding Apostle, Redeeming Love Church of
God the Bibleway, (May 26, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State University Law Review) [hereinafter
Cowart Interview]; see also Al Hackle, ‘Bibleway 5’ File to Have Charges Dismissed After Church Met
Through COVID Shutdown, STATESBORO HERALD, https://www.statesboroherald.com/local/bibleway5-file-to-have-charges-dismissed-after-church-met-through-covid-shutdown/ [https://perma.cc/VUX28KNT] (Sept. 4, 2020).
28. Cowart Interview, supra note 27.
29. See S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613, 1614 (2020) (Roberts,
C.J., concurring) (“The notion that it is ‘indisputably clear’ that the Government’s limitations are
unconstitutional seems quite improbable.”).
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the potential for future litigation continues to loom large, especially
when considering the possibility that renewed shelter-in-place Orders
may be issued in response to an ongoing pandemic, such as
COVID-19, or similar health-related emergencies that may occur in
the future.30 Should Georgia implement a new version of its ban on
large gatherings, organizations such as Dr. Cowart’s church would
likely file suit and force courts to decide whether such bans comport
with the religious liberty and freedom of assembly rights protected by
the First Amendment.31
Governor Kemp’s Executive Order Limiting Public Gatherings
On March 23, 2020, Governor Kemp issued an Executive Order
prohibiting gatherings of more than ten people in a single location “if
such gathering requires persons to stand or to be seated within six (6)
feet of any other person.”32 This ten-person limit remained in effect
until June 1 when the State permitted gatherings of twenty-five
people so long as the gatherers maintained six feet of distance
between each person. 33 And on June 11, Governor Kemp issued a
new Order increasing the number of people permitted to be in a
single location to fifty.34
Although some Georgians viewed Governor Kemp’s ban on
gatherings as a crucial defense against the virus’s spread, the Order
also gave rise to constitutional concerns.35 In particular, some
religious leaders in the state saw the ban on gatherings as a direct
impediment to their right to freely exercise their religion and to
peaceably assemble. 36 Although these constitutional concerns largely
30. Id.; cf. Arielle Mitropoulos et al., Novel Coronavirus Hospitalizations Increasing in 17 States,
ABC NEWS (June 19, 2020, 2:54 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/coronavirus-hospitalizationsincreasing-17-states/story?id=71349014 [https://perma.cc/J6QQ-4V5T] (discussing the increasing
numbers of COVID-19 cases throughout the early summer of 2020, suggesting that renewed shelter-inplace Orders could be issued to combat the spread of the disease).
31. Cowart Interview, supra note 27.
32. Ga. Exec. Order No. 03.23.20.01, at 2 (Mar. 23, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State University
Law Review).
33. Ga. Exec. Order No. 05.28.20.02, at 4 (May 28, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State University
Law Review).
34. Ga. Exec. Order No. 06.11.20.01, at 4 (June 11, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State University
Law Review).
35. See Cowart Interview, supra note 27.
36. Id.
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faded as Governor Kemp eased restrictions on gatherings, the
potential for renewed restrictions loomed large as confirmed cases of
the virus continued to surge statewide throughout the summer of
2020.37
In a March 16 press release, Governor Kemp encouraged, but did
not require, all faith-based organizations to cancel their in-person
services and public events. 38 On April 2, Governor Kemp issued his
most restrictive Executive Order of the pandemic—the statewide
shelter-in-place Order that prohibited gatherings of ten or more
people.39 Although this Order did not specifically reference churches,
it also lacked any explicit exemptions for religious organizations or
faith-based communities.40 The assumption that it applied to worship
services sparked outrage from some religious leaders who wished to
continue unaltered services.41
However, unlike governors from other states, Governor Kemp
never specifically ordered religious communities to stop holding
services.42 And on April 20, Governor Kemp formally announced
that churches could begin holding in-person services again as part of
his expansive efforts to reopen the state. 43 Additionally, when
President Trump declared all houses of worship to be “essential

37. Rebecca Lindstrom, Georgia Hospitals See Increase in Patients As COVID-19 Numbers Keep
Climbing,
11ALIVE,
https://www.11alive.com/article/news/health/coronavirus/coronavirusnumbers/georgia-covid-hospitalization-numbers-increase/85-5b03542a-45bb-47f9-8ff8-d9a01c2f2365
(July 14, 2020, 6:31 PM).
38. Press Release, Brian P. Kemp, Gov. of Georgia, Kemp: Public Health Emergency in Georgia
Effective March 14, 2020 (Mar. 16, 2020), https://gov.georgia.gov/press-releases/2020-03-16/kemppublic-health-emergency-georgia-effective-march-14-2020 [https://perma.cc/G6UK-EXBK].
39. Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.23.20.02 (Apr. 23, 2020) (on file with the Georgia State University Law
Review).
40. See id.
41. See Cowart Interview, supra note 27.
42. Brian Paglia, ‘Felt Like Homecoming’ – Forsyth County Churches Begin to Gather Again Amid
Coronavirus, FORSYTH CNTY. NEWS, https://www.forsythnews.com/life/faith-charity/felt-likehomecoming-forsyth-county-churches-begin-to-gather-again-amid-coronavirus/
[https://perma.cc/5RYZ-TX7H] (May 30, 2020, 6:00 AM). The most notable clashes between a
governor and church leaders occurred in California, where Governor Gavin Newsom (D) tightly
regulated the reopening of houses of worship. See Churches Amid the Pandemic: Some Outbreaks,
Many Challenges, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2020/07/12/us/apvirus-outbreak-churches-and-covid.html [https://perma.cc/2UCT-UGSM].
43. Lorenzo Reyes, Many Georgia Churches Stay Shut Despite Governor’s Measure that Allows
In-Person
Services,
USA
TODAY,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/health/2020/04/26/coronavirus-georgia-most-churches-remainclosed-services/3029894001/ [https://perma.cc/W4JJ-TKK9] (Apr. 26, 2020, 7:28 PM).
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services” on May 22, Governor Kemp applauded the decision and
encouraged churches, synagogues, and mosques to reopen their
doors.44 Governor Kemp further rolled back restrictions on June 11,
allowing gatherings of up to fifty people with appropriate social
distancing.45
Although Georgia’s restrictions on religious services were some of
the most lenient in the nation, at least one church in the state created
controversy when it defied all social distancing and crowd limit
measures, and held services as usual. 46 Just days after the statewide
shelter-in-place Order went into effect, Redeeming Love Church of
God the Bibleway in Statesboro held in-person services.47 Dr.
Cowart, the church’s pastor, had no compunction in admitting that
the twenty-to-forty attendees did not practice social distancing; as
part of their worship ceremony, they touched each other and held
hands.48 When state troopers saw the gathering, they shut it down and
issued citations to the pastor and three other attendees for reckless
conduct.49
Analysis
Given that Governor Brian Kemp’s (R) Executive Orders regulated
the way Georgians gathered and expressed their beliefs, the Orders
necessarily implicated the First Amendment. Specifically, Governor
Kemp’s ban on gatherings affected Georgians’ right to assemble and
their free exercise of religion.

44. Ryan Kruger, Gov. Kemp, Local Churches React to President Trump’s Comments of Houses of
Worship Reopening, 11ALIVE, https://www.11alive.com/article/news/health/coronavirus/trumpchurches-essential-reopen/85-555c58ec-f142-4f6e-bdbc-0a5ea145b460 (May 23, 2020, 12:24 AM). In a
May 28 press conference, Governor Kemp also emphasized that “we never closed places of worship.”
Press Release, Brian P. Kemp, Gov. of Georgia, Kemp, State Officials Give Update on COVID-19 (May
28, 2020), https://gov.georgia.gov/press-releases/2020-05-28/kemp-state-officials-give-update-covid-19
[https://perma.cc/6KBQ-FMLA]. Instead, he merely “encouraged congregations to hold online or
drive-in services to mitigate the risk of exposure.” Id.
45. Ga. Exec. Order No. 06.11.20.01, supra note 34.
46. Adam McCann, States with the Fewest Coronavirus Restrictions, WALLETHUB (July 21, 2020),
https://wallethub.com/edu/states-coronavirus-restrictions/73818/
[https://perma.cc/HL7X-4FNN];
Givens, supra note 26.
47. Cowart Interview, supra note 27.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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The First Amendment, incorporated to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the government from “abridging
the freedom of speech . . . or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble.”50 Additionally, the First Amendment’s Free Exercise
Clause ensures that no law prevents “the free exercise” of religion.51
The Supreme Court has interpreted these rights as jointly serving “a
common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication.”52
Moreover, these individual rights “are not confined to verbal
expression,” but rather encompass a broad range of conduct, speech,
and action.53 Further intermingling these rights, the Court has
analyzed some purported religious restrictions under the Freedom of
Speech Clause because religious viewpoints inherently constitute
expression.54 Regardless of the precise method of analysis, any laws
or executive actions that implicate the fundamental rights articulated
in the First Amendment will be subject to heightened scrutiny.55
Despite their breadth, however, First Amendment freedoms are not
absolute. The extenuating circumstances presented by the pandemic
led some courts to deviate from otherwise applicable First
Amendment black letter law. 56 Courts revived older doctrines
applicable only in emergency situations. 57 Citing century-old case
law, courts applied these rationales to claims of freedom of assembly
and religion.58
Specifically, the extraordinary nature of the threats to public health
posed by the novel pandemic led courts to breathe new life into the
50. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct.
2361, 2371 (2018) (“The First Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment,
prohibits laws that abridge the freedom of speech.”).
51. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
52. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980).
53. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141–42 (1966).
54. Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2607 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(“Laws that restrict speech based on the viewpoint it expresses are presumptively
unconstitutional . . . and under our cases religion counts as a viewpoint.” (first citing Iancu v. Brunetti,
139 S. Ct. 2294, 2298–99 (2019); then Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U. S. 819, 831 (1995))).
55. See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993).
56. Cassell v. Snyders, No. 20 C 50153, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77512, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 3,
2020).
57. Id.; In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772, 783 (5th Cir. 2020); Gish v. Newsom, No. EDCV 20-755 JGB,
2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74741, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2020).
58. See, e.g., Best Supplement Guide, LLC v. Newsom, No. 2:20-cv-00965-JAM-CKD, 2020 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 90608, at *8 (E.D. Cal. May 22, 2020) (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31
(1905)) (collecting COVID-19-related cases applying Jacobson).
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1905 Supreme Court decision Jacobson v. Massachusetts.59 Decided
in the midst of a smallpox outbreak, Jacobson upheld
Massachusetts’s mandatory vaccination law. 60 In reaching its
holding, the Court recognized each state’s “unquestioned power to
preserve and protect the public health.”61 Nearly every court that
opined on COVID-19 restrictions in the midst of the pandemic cited
to Jacobson, one of the few established Supreme Court precedents
directly related to a public health crisis.62 Courts almost uniformly
agreed that “COVID-19 qualifie[d] as the kind of public health crisis
that the Court contemplated in Jacobson.”63
Many courts relied on Jacobson to hold that “traditional tiers of
constitutional scrutiny [did] not apply” during the ongoing
pandemic.64 Instead, this alternate constitutional analysis called on
the judicial branch to only interfere with state-imposed restrictions
when the pronouncements had no “real or substantial relation to the
protection of the public health” or when they were “beyond all
question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the
fundamental law.”65 This test affords state governments broad
deference in regulating activities during a public health emergency. 66
59. Benner v. Wolf, No. 20-cv-775, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89425, at *15 (M.D. Pa. May 21, 2020)
(citing Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26) (recognizing Jacobson as “a case similar to the circumstances
presently before us”); Antietam Battlefield KOA v. Hogan, No. CCB-20-1130, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
88883, at *14–15 (D. Md. May 20, 2020) (citing Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 12–13, 28, 30–31) (“Since the
challenged orders are public health measures to address a disease outbreak, Jacobson provides the
proper scope of review.”).
60. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 11–22.
61. Id. at 22.
62. See, e.g., Benner, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89425, at *15; Hogan, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88883,
at *14–15.
63. Cassell v. Snyders, No. 20 C 50153, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77512, at *19 (N.D. Ill. May 3,
2020); Hogan, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88883, at *14 (“Numerous cases have applied the standard in
[Jacobson], when reviewing measures that curtail constitutional rights during the COVID-19
pandemic.”).
64. Cassell, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77512, at *6 (citing Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 27); Calvary Chapel
of Bangor v. Mills, No. 1:20-cv-00156-NT, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81962, at *16 (D. Me. May 9, 2020)
(quoting Cassell, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77512, at *6). But see, e.g., S. Bay United Pentecostal Church
v. Newsom, 959 F.3d 938, 942 (9th Cir.) (Collins, J., dissenting) (“Nothing in Jacobson supports the
view that an emergency displaces normal constitutional standards.”), denying injunction pending
appeal, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020).
65. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31.
66. See, e.g., Open Our Or. v. Brown, No. 6:20-cv-773-MC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87942, at *2–3
(D. Or. May 19, 2020) (“[T]his Court is inclined to side with the chorus of other federal courts in
pointing to Jacobson and rejecting similar constitutional claims brought by Plaintiffs challenging similar
COVID-19 restrictions in other states.”).
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Even during a crisis, however, a State may not discriminate based on
race or religion, or impose content-based suppressions of speech.67
After states began responding to the spread of COVID-19 by
imposing stay-at-home restrictions and bans on large gatherings, a
number of courts heard First Amendment challenges to those
decrees.68 Although not entirely consistent in their reasoning, courts
generally upheld the regulations as reasonable measures necessary to
contain the disease. 69 Religious organizations were particularly
litigious in this area. Although a divided Supreme Court denied the
injunctive relief sought by a California church on an interlocutory
appeal challenging that state’s restrictions on Free Exercise Clause
grounds and later dismissed an analogous appeal by Nevada
plaintiffs, federal circuit courts hearing similar cases from other
states came to different conclusions.70
Assembly Clause
The First Amendment guarantees individuals the right to
assembly.71 This right does not cover generalized licensing laws or
rights of “social association.”72 Instead, the right to freedom of
assembly includes “expressive association,” which are assemblies
deemed necessary to the exercise of other First Amendment rights
such as speech and religion. 73 In other words, the Supreme Court
traditionally protects assemblies and associations formed to combine
and elevate the participants’ individual rights of expression.74

67. Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2614 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting) (“COVID-19 is not a blank check for a State to discriminate against religious people,
religious organizations, and religious services.”).
68. See generally, e.g., Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 2020); First Pentecostal Church of
Holly Springs v. City of Holly Springs, 959 F.3d 669 (5th Cir. 2020); S. Bay United Pentecostal
Church, 959 F.3d at 938.
69. Mills, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81962, at *17 (collecting cases and noting that “courts across this
country have repeatedly upheld orders meant to curb the spread of COVID-19”).
70. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020); Elim Romanian
Pentecostal Church v. Pritzker, 962 F.3d 341, 346 (7th Cir. 2020) (“We line up with Chief Justice
Roberts.”); Neace, 958 F.3d at 416 (striking down Kentucky’s ban on mass gatherings as
unconstitutional and granting the church’s motion for injunctive relief).
71. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
72. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989).
73. Id.
74. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984).
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A key inquiry in freedom of assembly cases is whether the state’s
restriction is content-based or content-neutral.75 Typically,
“peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a
crime.”76 But a State may impose neutral restrictions on such
assembly whose purposes are not related to the content or message
expressed at the assembly. 77 Courts subject these time, place, and
manner restrictions to intermediate scrutiny—a lower level than the
strict scrutiny applied to restrictions a State imposes for the purpose
of suppressing expression.78 Under intermediate scrutiny in the First
Amendment context, a restriction must be “narrowly tailored to serve
a significant governmental interest” and must “leave open ample
alternative channels for communication of the information.”79
Applying the Assembly Clause to COVID-19 Restrictions
State bans on gatherings, like those imposed during the COVID-19
pandemic, implicate the freedom of assembly because they limit the
individual’s ability to congregate for expressive purposes.80
Therefore, in deciding whether a ban on gathering violates the
Assembly Clause, courts must determine whether the ban is
content-based or content-neutral.81 A ban on gatherings is
content-neutral when it does not distinguish between types of
gatherings and requires no inquiry into the content expressed at
certain gatherings.82 On the other hand, bans on gatherings are

75. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015).
76. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937).
77. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
78. Id. Content-based restrictions will survive only where they are narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest. Reed, 576 U.S. at 163.
79. Ward, 491 at 791.
80. See, e.g., Ramsek v. Beshear, No. 3:20-cv-00036-GFVT, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110668, at
*23–27 (E.D. Ky. June 24, 2020); McCarthy v. Cuomo, No. 20-cv-2124 (ARR), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
107195, at *11–12 (E.D.N.Y. June 18, 2020); ACA Int’l v. Healey, No. 20-10767-RGS, 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 79716, at *10–11 (D. Mass. May 6, 2020).
81. Reed, 576 U.S. at 164.
82. McCarthy, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107195, at *11–12; Ramsek, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110668,
at *28. Although the Kentucky ban was content-neutral, the court struck it down because it did not pass
intermediate scrutiny. Ramsek, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110668, at *28. Specifically, the district court
found the ban to be overbroad and not narrowly tailored to advance the government’s goal of mitigating
the spread of COVID-19. Id. at *29.
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content-based when they exempt certain types of gatherings and
require officials to inquire into the content of the gatherings.83
Even if a ban is content-neutral, it will still fail intermediate
scrutiny if it is overbroad. 84 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Kentucky applied this type of analysis in Ramsek v.
Beshear when it found that Kentucky’s ban on gatherings was not
narrowly tailored despite being content-neutral.85 The court took
issue with the fact that the Kentucky Order implemented an
unnecessary blanket ban on all large gatherings.86 The court opined
that the Order could have more narrowly tailored the ban and still
achieved its goals by requiring masks, social distancing, and
hand-washing, as were required in commercial establishments.87 In
one of the few cases where the plaintiffs prevailed, the district court
held that Kentucky’s ban on gatherings was unconstitutional because
it “completely eliminate[d] Kentuckians’ ability to gather for
in-person exercise of their First Amendment rights.”88
Governor Brian Kemp’s Executive Orders Likely Comply with
the Assembly Clause
Governor Kemp’s ban on large gatherings likely did not violate the
Assembly Clause of the First Amendment for three primary reasons.
First, none of Governor Kemp’s bans on gatherings made
content-based distinctions.89 Unlike the Illinois ban that carved out an
exception for religious gatherings, Georgia’s ban prohibited “all
businesses, establishments, corporations, non-profit corporations,
[and] organizations” and local governments from allowing
gatherings.90 Under Georgia’s ban, government officials did not need
83. Ill. Republican Party v. Pritzker, No. 20 C 3489, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116383, at *16 (N.D.
Ill.), aff’d 973 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2020). Here, Illinois specifically exempted religious gatherings from
the statewide ban on gatherings. Id. at *3–4. This exception required government officials to inquire into
the nature and content of gatherings in enforcing the Order. Id. Such an inquiry is evidence of a
content-based restriction. Id. However, this ban survived strict scrutiny because it was narrowly tailored
to advance a compelling interest. Id. at *24–25.
84. Ramsek, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110668, at *34.
85. Id.
86. Id. at *29.
87. Id. at *10.
88. Id. at *34.
89. See, e.g., Ga. Exec. Order No. 03.23.20.01, supra note 32.
90. See, e.g., Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.23.20.02, supra note 39, at 11 (emphasis added).
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to differentiate between types of gatherings and types of content to
enforce the ban effectively. For this reason, Georgia’s ban on
gatherings was content-neutral.
Second, Georgia’s ban on gatherings was narrowly tailored to
achieve a significant government interest. Every court that took up
the issue acknowledged that stopping the spread of COVID-19—
Georgia’s reason for imposing its ban—was not only a significant
interest but a compelling one. 91 Further, Georgia advanced this
interest through a narrowly tailored means. Since April 23, 2020,
Governor Kemp qualified his ban by allowing for gatherings where
the grouping was “transitory or incidental, or if their grouping [was]
the result of being spread across more than one Single Location.”92
Gatherings were also permitted where persons maintained six feet of
distance from any other person. 93 Unlike Kentucky’s unqualified,
blanket prohibition on all gatherings, Georgia’s ban still allowed for
gatherings under certain circumstances. For example, some of the
largest protests in Georgia’s history occurred during the summer of
2020 in response to police killings of Black civilians.94 Nevertheless,
these massive gatherings did not conflict with Governor Kemp’s
Orders because protestors were not required to be within six feet of
other persons.95
Third, the Executive Orders never banned expression, but to the
extent that they did, Governor Kemp provided adequate alternative
channels of expression. In Ramsek, the court noted that it was “not
good enough” for Kentucky to provide, as an alternative for
in-person political protest, the ability to gather in parked cars in a
parking lot.96 The Kentucky decree challenged in that case, of course,
91. E.g., Ill. Republican Party v. Pritzker, No. 20 C 3489, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116383, at *11
(N.D. Ill.), aff’d, 973 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2020); Ramsek, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110668, at *27;
McCarthy v. Cuomo, No. 20-cv-2124 (ARR), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107195, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. June
18, 2020).
92. Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.23.20.02, supra note 39, at 4.
93. Id.
94. J. Scott Trubey et al., Thousands March As Protests Continue for 10th Day Across Metro
Atlanta, ATLANTA J.-CONST., https://www.ajc.com/news/local-govt—politics/thousands-marchprotests-continue-for-10th-day-across-metro-atlanta/eY0LEBV9l3V0ZFlqkLSxxM/
[https://perma.cc/8HRG-HQVH] (June 7, 2020).
95. Adrianne M. Haney, Gov. Kemp Blames Spike in COVID-19 Cases on Widespread Protests on
Racial Injustice, 11ALIVE, https://www.11alive.com/article/news/health/coronavirus/atlanta-protestscovid-spike-kemp-claims/85-b16993e3-ce89-43a3-808a-723a5347a568 (July 17, 2020, 8:03 PM).
96. Ramsek, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110668 at *5.
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was very different from Georgia’s Order, which did not categorically
ban in-person protests or gatherings. Indeed, the social distancing
requirements on large gatherings were not so cumbersome so as to
prevent expression in the first place. 97 For these reasons, Georgia’s
ban on gatherings would likely survive a freedom of assembly
challenge.
Free Exercise Clause
The First Amendment protects religious liberty; this concept,
embodied in the Free Exercise Clause, includes the right of
individuals to believe in the religion of their choice, or lack thereof,
and the right of individuals to generally act in accordance with those
beliefs.98 Religious activities, however, are not exempt from
generally applicable laws.99 On the other hand, any laws, regulations,
or other government acts targeting religion are subject to strict
scrutiny.100 Those laws will only survive constitutional scrutiny if
they are “justified by a compelling interest and [are] narrowly
tailored to advance that interest,” meaning that a State must typically
defend its actions by providing the court with strong policy
justifications that it cannot achieve through less restrictive means. 101
In June 2020, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that states
unconstitutionally target religion when they treat religious groups
differently than secular groups or when laws discriminate based on
religious affiliation.102
Under a traditional Free Exercise Clause framework, churches and
other religious organizations wishing to challenge restrictions on
in-person gatherings would need to demonstrate that the challenged
97. See Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.23.20.02, supra note 39.
98. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
99. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990), superseded by
statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 107 Stat. 1488, as recognized in Holt v. Hobbs,
574 U.S. 352 (2015).
100. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993); Trinity
Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2016 (2017).
101. Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 531–32.
102. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2254 (2020) (“The Free Exercise Clause,
which applies to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment, ‘protects religious observers against
unequal treatment’ and against ‘laws that impose special disabilities on the basis of religious status.’”
(quoting Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2021)).
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Orders would not qualify as generally applicable laws.103 Potential
plaintiffs increase their likelihood of success when they point to
evidence that the Orders subjected them to restrictions beyond those
applied to other types of gatherings. 104 Crucially, as explained supra,
“laws that burden religion while exempting the non-religious must
pass strict scrutiny.”105
Applying the Free Exercise Clause to COVID-19 Restrictions
Congregations challenging COVID-19 restrictions attempted to
invoke strict scrutiny by showing that purported bans on large
gatherings were not enforced against protesters. 106 In other cases,
plaintiffs argued that the Executive Orders targeted churches while
exempting other types of gatherings such as food banks and essential
social services.107 In one notable case, the Sixth Circuit struck down
Kentucky’s ban on large gatherings, reasoning that the Governor’s
Orders violated the Free Exercise Clause because they explicitly
outlawed “faith-based based gatherings by name” while exempting
comparable secular groups and businesses such as law firms and
liquor stores.108
The Supreme Court addressed similar arguments in May 2020
when it denied interlocutory injunctive relief to a California church
challenging a ban on large gatherings under the Free Exercise
Clause.109 Chief Justice Roberts, concurring in the judgment, noted
that “[s]imilar or more severe restrictions apply to comparable
secular gatherings, including lectures, concerts, movie showings,
spectator sports, and theatrical performances.”110 Chief Justice
Roberts went on to opine that gatherings at grocery stores and banks,
exempted from the ban under California Governor Gavin Newsom’s
(D) Executive Order, did not qualify as similar or comparable to

103. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878–79; Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 409, 413 (6th Cir. 2020) (analyzing
COVID-19 restrictions on religious gatherings).
104. Neace, 958 F.3d at 413–14.
105. Spell v. Edwards, 962 F.3d 175, 181 (5th Cir. 2020) (Ho, J., concurring).
106. Id.
107. Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church v. Pritzker, 962 F.3d 341, 345 (7th Cir. 2020).
108. Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear, 957 F.3d 610, 614 (6th Cir. 2020).
109. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613 (2020).
110. Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
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church gatherings.111 When conducting a Free Exercise Clause
analysis, courts should instead examine whether Executive Orders
subject churches to the same restrictions as other “large groups of
people gather[ed] in close proximity for extended periods of time.”112
Justice Kavanaugh dissented and explicitly disagreed, stating that
“California’s latest safety guidelines discriminate against places of
worship and in favor of comparable secular businesses.”113
The Court reaffirmed its deference to state regulations of religious
gatherings in Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak.114 In Calvary
Chapel, the Court rejected a Nevada church’s request for an
injunction against the state’s fifty-person limit on religious
gatherings.115 The church argued that churches were singled out by
this policy because Nevada allowed casinos, restaurants, and bars to
operate at higher capacities.116 The State argued, however, that the
policy treated churches the same as other venues where large crowds
gathered—such as concerts and sporting events.117 Although the
Court majority provided no reasoning for its ruling, the central
question for the district court judge who presided over the case was
“[w]hether a church is more like a casino or more like a concert or
lecture hall for purposes of assessing risk of COVID-19
transmission.”118 This distinction echoed the one drawn by Chief
Justice Roberts in the challenge to California’s restrictions.119

111. Id. Chief Justice Roberts also said that he reached this result, in part, because the plaintiffs
applied for injunctive relief as opposed to a stay, and that “[s]uch a request demands a significantly
higher justification than a request for a stay because, unlike a stay, an injunction does not simply
suspend judicial alteration of the status quo but grants judicial intervention that has been withheld by
lower courts.” Id. And courts should only grant this type of relief where “the legal rights at issue are
indisputably clear” and, even then, do so “sparingly and only in the most critical and exigent
circumstances.” Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1614 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
114. Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603 (2020).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2605 (Alito, J., dissenting).
117. Id.
118. Adam Liptak, Split 5 to 4, Supreme Court Rejects Nevada Church’s Challenge to Shutdown
Restrictions, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/24/us/supreme-courtnevada-church-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/XB5T-JS5Z].
119. Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley, 140 S. Ct. at 2608 (Alito, J., dissenting); S. Bay United
Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613 (2020).
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Governor Brian Kemp’s Executive Orders Likely Comply with
the Free Exercise Clause
Although this area of law remains prone to rapid evolution,
Governor Kemp’s Executive Orders would likely survive
constitutional scrutiny, especially under the Jacobson public health
emergency standard applied by numerous circuit courts and by Chief
Justice Robert’s concurrence in South Bay United Pentecostal
Church v. Newsom.120 Those courts denied injunctive relief when
churches challenged Executive Orders significantly more
burdensome to the exercise of religion than the Georgia Orders.121
Governor Kemp’s Order did not single out religious groups but rather
banned gatherings of more than ten people at any “business,
establishment,
corporation,
non-profit
corporation,
or
organization.”122
Even under the reasoning of dissenting Justices Kavanaugh and
Gorsuch, respectively, the Georgia restrictions could prevail because
the dissenters emphasized how California and Nevada’s executive
actions specifically subjected churches to restrictions not applicable
to other businesses. As Justice Kavanaugh explained, “the Court’s
precedents do not require that religious organizations be treated more
favorably than all secular organizations. Rather, the First Amendment
requires that religious organizations be treated equally to the favored
or exempt secular organizations . . . .”123 He went on to question how
the states’ proffered justifications for limiting church services—the
public health risks of gathering in large groups—would not apply
with equal force to restrictions on restaurants and casinos.124 Because
he found that both the California and Nevada laws discriminated
against religion, he would have applied strict scrutiny and granted
injunctive relief to the plaintiffs. 125 Justice Gorsuch expressed his

120. See, e.g., S. Bay United Pentecostal Church, 140 S. Ct. at 1613. The Supreme Court only heard
these challenges at the injunctive relief phase without full briefing or oral argument on the merits of the
claims. See, e.g., id.; Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley, 140 S. Ct. at 2603.
121. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church, 140 S. Ct. at 1613; see also discussion supra Section
Applying the Free Exercise Clause to COVID-19 Restrictions.
122. Ga. Exec. Order No. 03.23.20.01, supra note 32.
123. Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley, 140 S. Ct. at 2613 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
124. Id.
125. Id.
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similar sentiments more bluntly: “In Nevada, it seems, it is better to
be in entertainment than religion. Maybe that is nothing new. But the
First Amendment prohibits such obvious discrimination against the
exercise of religion.”126
This reasoning—that strict scrutiny applies because of the
disparate treatment of religion—likely would not apply to Governor
Kemp’s Executive Orders because the Georgia restrictions on large
groups did not distinguish between religious congregations and other
gatherings. In contrast to the California and Nevada Orders, and also
unlike the Kentucky ban struck down by the Sixth Circuit, Governor
Kemp’s proclamations did not even mention churches. Instead, the
Orders applied broadly to a large number of potential gatherings and
businesses.127
Churches could successfully challenge the Orders, however, if they
demonstrate that the Orders—as-applied—unfairly targeted their
organizations. Dr. Clayton Cowart, the president of Redeeming Love
Church of God the Bibleway’s parent company, would likely make
this argument, especially after his church received citations from the
Georgia State Patrol for continuing to congregate during the shelter
in place.128 If Dr. Cowart could produce evidence that non-religious
gatherings were not penalized in the way his church service was, he
may have grounds to assert a Free Exercise Clause challenge because
state actions “that single out the religious for disfavored treatment” in
any way “trigger the strictest scrutiny.”129
Dr. Cowart would similarly have a case if he could demonstrate
that the intent of the Executive Orders was to target religious groups,
especially after the decision in Espinoza v. Montana Department of
Revenue.130 In Espinoza, the Court devoted considerable attention to
126. Id. at 2609 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
127. See Ga. Exec. Order No. 04.02.20.01, supra note 22, at 2 (“No business, establishment,
corporation, non-profit corporation, organization, . . . shall allow more than ten (10) persons to be
gathered at a single location.”).
128. Cowart Interview, supra note 27. The church filed motions to dismiss the criminal charges
brought against five of its members for violating the shelter-in-place Order. Hackle, supra note 27. The
motions relied primarily on the Free Exercise Clause, arguing that the State discriminatorily enforced
the Executive Order against churches but permitted commercial establishments such as Wal-Mart to
continue operating. Id. As of October 10, 2020, Bulloch County State Court had not yet ruled on the
church’s motions. Id.
129. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2015 (2017).
130. Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2254–57 (2020).
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the discriminatory origins of a Montana law prohibiting aid to
religious schools, which the Court held unconstitutional as violative
of the Free Exercise Clause. 131 Thus, if Dr. Cowart chose to bring
suit against the governor on that basis, he would likely need evidence
of the executive branch’s animus towards his church or towards
religious groups generally. 132 This hypothetical, of course, is
unlikely. In fact, Governor Kemp specifically expressed that he never
required houses of worship to close, and he was one of the first
governors in the nation to encourage them to reopen. 133
Any Forthcoming Challenges to Governor Brian Kemp’s Executive
Orders are Likely Moot
As of October 2020, no court had ruled on a Free Exercise Clause
challenge to Governor Kemp’s Executive Orders banning large
gatherings.134 In June 2020, Governor Kemp amended the ban to
allow for gatherings of up to fifty people.135 If a social event,
business, church, or other gathering was cited for violating the new
limit of fifty people, then their dispute could be resolved in
accordance with the aforementioned frameworks. Governor Kemp’s
office and other executive branch agencies, however, did not show
strong willingness to enforce any aspects of the fifty-person ban.
Moreover, because the relevant provisions of the Orders evolved,
courts could find that any new challenge to the prior, more restrictive
ban would fail justiciability requirements, and a court would not
proceed to analyze the merits. 136 Specifically, the expiration of the
prior Orders would likely render plaintiffs’ claims moot. Under
Georgia law, “[a] case is moot ‘when it seeks to determine an issue
which, if resolved, cannot have any practical effect on the underlying
controversy, or when such resolution will determine only abstract
questions not arising upon existing facts or rights.’”137
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Press Release, supra note 44.
134. See discussion supra note 24.
135. Ga. Exec. Order No. 06.11.20.01, supra note 34.
136. Shelley v. Town of Tyrone, 302 Ga. 297, 308, 806 S.E.2d 535, 543 (2017) (“[M]ootness is an
issue of jurisdiction and thus must be determined before a court addresses the merits of a claim.”).
137. Barrow v. Raffensperger, 308 Ga. 660, 667, 842 S.E.2d 884, 891 (2020) (quoting Pimper v. State
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Federal courts have similar mootness requirements.138 In fact,
when hearing a First Amendment challenge to Louisiana’s
since-rescinded COVID-19 restrictions, the Fifth Circuit held that
rescission rendered the plaintiffs’ claim moot.139 The court
acknowledged that the governor might eventually reimpose the
restrictions but characterized that possibility as “speculative, at
best.”140 Other courts addressing this issue similarly affirmed
mootness adjudications, even suggesting that “it seems unlikely that
[COVID-19 restrictions] w[ould] be reissued.”141 Even if Governor
Kemp or future governors eventually reinstate some form of
shelter-in-place or ban on gatherings, a court cannot speculate that
future Orders will include identical language as the prior ones.
Conclusion
The First Amendment is implicated any time the government
places restrictions on how and when people may gather to express
their beliefs and religions. Measures adopted in response to a global
pandemic are no exception to this. However, Governor Brian Kemp’s
(R) ban on gatherings likely did not infringe upon the First
Amendment rights of Georgians for three reasons. First, the revived
prominence of Jacobson bestows upon state officials great latitude in
addressing public health emergencies. Second, Governor Kemp’s ban
on gatherings was content-neutral and narrowly tailored to achieve a
substantial interest. And third, the ban in no way targeted religion.
Alex N. Estroff & Boris W. Gautier

ex rel. Simpson, 274 Ga. 624, 626, 555 S.E.2d 459, 461 (2001)).
138. See generally United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532 (2018). If it appears likely that
Governor Kemp will reinstate a similar ban on large gatherings at any time, plaintiffs could argue that
the mootness exception for controversies “capable of repetition, yet evading review” applies. See id. at
1540. The nuances of the mootness doctrine are beyond the scope of this Peach Sheet, but absent a
direct threat of future persecution by state officials under the large-gathering prohibition, plaintiffs
would likely not succeed. See Spell v. Edwards, 962 F.3d 175, 175 (5th Cir. 2020).
139. Spell, 962 F.3d at 175.
140. Id.
141. Cameron v. Beshear, No. 3:20-cv-00023-GFVT, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89594, at *2 (E.D. Ky.
May 21, 2020); see also Spell, 962 F.3d at 175 (“The trend in Louisiana has been to reopen the state, not
to close it down.”).
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